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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence.  The state 
challenges the district court’s determination that ascertaining probation status is not a valid 
component of a traffic stop. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Cora Lee Burgess with possession of methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 
60-61.)  She filed a motion to suppress, asserting that “the warrantless extension of the stop 
by the officers was unlawful and without legal justification.”  (R., pp. 62-63.)  After a 
hearing (R., p. 94), the district court found the following facts: 
 Officers stopped Burgess for a traffic infraction.  (R., pp. 94-95.)  Joshua Craig was 
the passenger in the pickup.  (R., p. 95.)  Officers gathered the relevant information from 
Burgess and Craig.  (R., p. 95.)  Both were nervous, and “Craig appeared as if he was under 
the influence of something.”  (R., p. 95.)  During the next seven and one-half minutes 
officers checked Burgess’s and Craig’s information using the computer in the police car.  
(R., p. 95.)  About five and one-half minutes into that process Burgess’s check was 
completed and Craig’s check was completed except for determining his probation status.  
(R., pp. 95-96.)  Thus, the final two minutes of checking the vehicle occupants’ information 
were dedicated to an inquiry into Craig’s probation status.  (R., pp. 96, 100.1)   
                                            
1 The district court found that Craig was not on probation (R., pp. 95-96), but that finding 
is clearly erroneous.  The testimony was that Craig was on unsupervised probation (Tr., p. 
21, L. 22 – p. 22, L. 1) and the exhibit corroborates that testimony when dispatch informs 
the officers that Craig was a drug court participant (State’s Exhibit 1, at 11:25-11:29).  If 
this fact becomes significant for the analysis, the state requests this Court to apply the clear 
error standard and reverse the district court’s factual finding. 
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 After completing the check of the occupants’ information, including the inquiry 
into Craig’s probation status, one officer issued Burgess a citation while another officer 
interacted with Craig.  (R., pp. 96-97.)  When Craig admitted having syringes, officers 
detained both Burgess and Craig.  (R., pp. 96-97; see also Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-9; p. 30, Ls. 1-
6.)  Burgess later gave consent to search.  (R., p. 97.) 
 The district court characterized the issue presented as “whether delaying moving 
forward with a traffic stop is lawful in order to verify a passenger’s probation status.”  (R., 
p. 101.)  The district court declared that the “dispositive fact” was that “there was some 
time (‘a minute or two’) between the time [the officer] finished checking Burgess’s 
information and the commencement of issuing her a citation.”  (R., p. 100.)  The district 
court concluded that the officers’ action of confirming Craig’s probation status was not “a 
permissible task tied to the traffic infraction.”  (R., p. 101 (internal quotation omitted).)  
Thus, the act of “waiting a minute or two for dispatch to verify a passenger’s probation 
status before proceeding with issuing the driver a traffic citation” unlawfully prolonged the 
stop.  (R., pp. 94, 98-102.)  The district court therefore granted the motion to suppress.  (R., 
p. 102.) 








 Did the district court err when it concluded that inquiries into probation status are 







Inquiries Into Probation Status Are Not Beyond The Scope Of A Routine Records Check 




 The district court concluded that a check of Craig’s probation status through a 
records check by dispatch was a separate investigation beyond the scope of a traffic stop.  
Review of the applicable law shows that although inquiries into potential unrelated 
criminal activities are beyond the scope of a traffic stop, inquiries into non-criminal matters 
such as outstanding warrants and probation and parole status are within the scope of a 
routine records check conducted pursuant to a traffic stop.  The district court erred by 
holding otherwise. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on 
a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the trial court’s findings 
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the court] freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 
728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Concluded That An Inquiry Into Craig’s 
Probation Status Was Beyond The Scope Of A Routine Records Check 
 
 “Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 
context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that 
warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”  Rodriguez v. United States, ___ 
U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (internal citations omitted).  In the course of 
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investigating the traffic violation and attending to related safety concerns an officer 
conducting a traffic stop may make “ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.”  Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).  “Typically such inquiries involve checking the 
driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and 
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”  Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at 
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; see also State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 367 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Ct. 
App. 2016) (“Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not 
necessarily violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights.”).  In addition, “inquiries into 
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not 
convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries 
do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 
(2009).  Application of these legal standards shows that the district court erred when it 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officers’ inquiry into Craig’s 
probation status. 
Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Idaho appellate courts have 
weighed in on the permissible scope of the “ordinary inquiries incident to [a traffic] stop,” 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, other than that they “typically” include the existence and validity 
of the driver’s license, registration, and insurance, and also include whether there are 
outstanding warrants, Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.  Courts that have 
specifically considered whether probation status is within the scope of permissible inquiries 
incident to a traffic stop have held that it is.  United States v. Hendrix, 143 F.Supp.3d 724 
(M.D. Tenn. 2015); United States v. Rodriguez, 100 F.Supp.3d 905, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 




sought information that would be revealed by a routine records check militate against a 
finding of unreasonableness”); United States v. Singleton, 608 F.Supp.2d 397, 404 
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (officer justified in asking stopped defendant “whether he was then on 
probation or parole”); Miller v. State, 922 A.2d 1158, 1163 (Del. 2007) (“it was permissible 
for Officer Kelly to ask Miller if he was on probation, while Miller was lawfully detained 
initially to enforce the loitering statute”).  Because, like the inquiry into the existence of 
outstanding warrants, inquiry into the probation or parole status of a stopped person is part 
of the ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop, the district court erred.   
In making its ruling, the district court relied on two cases out of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  (R., p. 101.)  Neither of these cases support the district court’s holding. 
In United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015), a Nevada officer 
conducting a traffic stop, after running routine checks which returned negative, “requested 
an ex-felon registration check.”  Id. at 782-83.  Under Nevada law a person convicted of 
certain felonies has to register with the county sheriff, and failure to do so is a 
misdemeanor.  Id. at 783 n.5.  The court held that the “additional” check on whether Evans 
was an unregistered felon, conducted after completion of the ordinary inquiries attendant 
to a traffic stop, was “wholly unrelated” to the purposes of the stop and was instead “aimed 
at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”  Id. at 786 (internal brackets and 
quotes omitted).  
In United States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2017), Gorman contested the 
forfeiture of alleged drug proceeds.  The facts included that he was stopped for a traffic 
violation by a police officer in Nevada who, suspecting Gorman was transporting drug 
money, “unsuccessfully attempted to summon a drug-sniffing dog and then prolonged 
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Gorman’s roadside detention, which lasted nearly half an hour, as he conducted a non-
routine records check.”  Id. at 709.  The “non-routine records check” used to extend the 
encounter was a contact with the “El Paso Intelligence Center” (EPIC) to  
compare Gorman’s home address with its database of information related 
to drug and weapons smuggling, money laundering, and human trafficking. 
EPIC returned a notification that there was a Drug Enforcement Agency 
“hit” on Gorman involving the transfer of $11,000 in 2006. EPIC also 
indicated that Gorman had entered or exited the United States four times, 
on one occasion flying from Madrid, Spain to John F. Kennedy Airport in 
New York. [The officer] told the EPIC operator that he did not “have a dog 
on [him]” and that he was “going to try to gain consent” and would “call 
and let [EPIC] know” whether he succeeded in gaining Gorman’s consent 
to search the vehicle. [The officer] also asked EPIC to run a search on a 
different address associated with Gorman, which returned the same results. 
 
Id. at 711 (text “[The officer]” added, other bracketed text original).  The Ninth Circuit 
panel, citing Evans, 786 F.3d at 788, concluded the EPIC inquiry was also “aimed at 
detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” and was therefore not an inquiry 
incident to the traffic stop.  Gorman, 859 F.3d at 715. 
 Neither the holdings nor the analyses in Evans and Gorman support the district 
court’s reasoning in this case.  In Evans the inquiry was into whether Evans committed the 
unrelated misdemeanor of failing to register as a felon and in Gorman the inquiry was into 
whether Gorman was transporting drug proceeds.  Inquiry into Craig’s probation status, 
like inquiry into whether there were any outstanding arrest warrants, was not an 
investigation of some separate crime.  Just like having an outstanding arrest warrant is not 
a crime, being on probation is not a crime.  Rather, the inquiry into probation or parole 
status, like the inquiry into outstanding warrants, is related to the mission of traffic law 
enforcement and officer safety and is not “a measure aimed at detecting evidence of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”  Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at ___ 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (internal 
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quote and brackets omitted).  Unlike stopping the traffic inquiries to use a drug dog to 
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, which “abandon[ed] the purpose of the 
stop,” the probation inquiry in this case did not “deviate from the original purpose of the 
stop.”  State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).   
 The officers in this case did not deviate from the purposes of the stop when they 
made the inquiry about Craig’s probation status.  Unlike the cases relied on by the district 
court, an inquiry into a driver’s or passenger’s probation status does not initiate a criminal 
investigation unrelated to the purpose of the stop.  Rather, like the warrant check, it 
addresses the traffic violation that warranted the stop and the related safety concerns.  The 





 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order 
suppressing evidence obtained during the traffic stop. 




      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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